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Abstract
This paper considers a principal-agent relationship and explores the incen-
tive provision when the agent’s performance cannot be verified. It contrasts
two alternatives for the principal to provide incentives: (i) to subjectively
evaluate the agent’s performance; and (ii), to delegate this task to a super-
visor. Supervision induces contractible information about the agent’s per-
formance, but could result in vertical collusion. This paper demonstrates
that collusion-proofness can require an inefficiently high payment to the su-
pervisor, and too low powered incentives for the agent. The eventuality of
collusion is further found to potentially (i), improve the profitability; and
(ii), facilitate the achievement of relational contracts based upon subjective
performance evaluations.
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1 Introduction
In many employment relationships, employees’ contribution to firm value is non-
contractible. Firms therefore need to apply alternative mechanisms to provide
their employees with appropriates incentives. One alternative is to draw on sub-
jective performance evaluations which constitute a crucial component of incen-
tives schemes in firms [Gibbons, 2005]. For instance, Gibbs [1995] reported that
25 percent of employees in middle management positions receive bonus payments
on the basis of subjective evaluations of their individual performance.1 Such in-
centive payments however, cannot be legally enforced, and their reliability is per-
ceived as questionable whenever firms lack sufficient reputations for honoring
their non-enforceable obligations. Nevertheless, the credibility of these incentive
payments can be augmented by involving a supervisor as supposedly neutral party
in the evaluation process. Yet, delegating the subjective performance evaluation to
a supervisor can impose an additional inefficiency: The involved parties might be
tempted to engage in vertical collusion with the aim of swaying the supervisor’s
evaluation to their own favor.
The consideration of supervision as a potential device to strengthen the credi-
bility of incentive payments based on subjective evaluations raises two important
questions: First, how does potential collusion influence the incentive provision in
the absence of verifiable performance measures? Secondly, how do incentive con-
tracts have to be adjusted in order to prevent vertical side-contracting? This paper
aims to answer these questions by shedding light on the design of incentive con-
tracts in a principal-agent relationship, when verifiable performance measures are
unavailable. This paper elaborates on two alternatives for the principal to provide
the agent with incentives: (i) to subjectively evaluate his performance; and (ii),
to delegate the performance evaluation to a supervisor. As a supposedly neutral
party, the supervisor can credibly confirm the agent’s achieved performance such
that it can be applied in an enforceable incentive contract. As mentioned above
however, empowering the supervisor to subjectively evaluate the agent’s perfor-
mance might create incentives for the involved parties to engage in collusion.
1Similarly, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus [2004] found that incentive payments
of 23 percent of managers in car dealerships are tied to a subjective appraisal of their performance.
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This paper points out that the effect of potential collusion on the provision of
incentives is twofold. First, it may force firms to adopt less efficient spot contracts,
whereas supervision would have been more profitable otherwise. This imposes an
inefficiency on organizations whenever superior relational contracts based upon
the principal’s subjective evaluation are not feasible. Second, potential collusion
can be beneficial for organizations since it could facilitate the achievement, or
improve the profitability of superior relational contracts contingent on subjective
performance evaluations. The latter implication follows from the fact that po-
tential collusion strengthens the principal’s credibility for paying non-enforceable
incentive payments due to a less profitable contractual alternative. This paper
further characterizes the adjustment of incentive contracts necessary to achieve
collusion proofness; and exposes two important observations. First, collusion-
proofness can require the provision of inefficiently low powered incentives to the
agent. Second, the supervisor obtains a compensation, potentially exceeding the
efficient level that is necessary to ensure his participation.
There is a growing body of literature investigating the application of subjective
performance measures in incentive contracts. One stream, notably Bull [1987],
MacLeod and Malcomson [1989], Levin [2003], and MacLeod [2003], consid-
ered the incentive provision when the principal depends solely on subjective per-
formance evaluations as objective, i.e. verifiable measures are unavailable. Al-
though the corresponding relational contracts cannot be legally enforced, they can
be self-enforcing in repeated games. This occurs whenever the involved parties
have no incentives to deviate from their stipulated behavior. By contrast, Baker,
Gibbons, and Murphy [1994], Pearce and Stacchetti [1998], and Demougin and
Fabel [2004] focused on the optimal combination of subjective and objective per-
formance measures in incentive contracts. Subjective measures are thereby found
to be an integral part of incentive schemes in agency relationships. The aforemen-
tioned studies however, restricted their attention to the subjective performance
evaluation conducted by the principal. Since it is of particular practical relevance,
the next logical step is to incorporate a supervisor as a potential device to augment
the credibility of incentive payments contingent on subjective evaluations.
Previous literature concerned with vertical side-contracting in agency relation-
ships focused on the case where the supervisor has an information advantage
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compared to the principal. In particular, the supervisor is assumed to privately
observe either random productivity shocks [Tirole, 1986, Kofman and Lawarree,
1993, Villadsen, 1995], the true cost of an implemented project [Strausz, 1997],
the agent’s type [Faure-Grimaud, Laffont, and Martimort, 2003], or the agent’s
effort [Kessler, 2000]. These information asymmetries could induce the agent to
collude with the supervisor aimed at ensuring he withholds or misrepresents his
private information. The approach pursued in this paper however, differs in one
main aspect. Here, the supervisor is in charge of confirming the agent’s perfor-
mance, which is observable by all involved parties. Since this confirmation even-
tually determines the agent’s incentive payment, the agent as well as the principal
could be tempted to collude with the supervisor in order to sway his assessment
to their own advantage.
This paper proceeds as follows. The subsequent section introduces the basic
model. Section 3 derives the optimal contracts for the principal’s respective alter-
native for providing the agent with incentives. In section 4, the optimal incentive
provision is identified; and investigated in light of how it is affected by potential
collusion. Section 5 summarizes the main results and concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an infinitely repeated employment relationship between a principal and
an agent. Both parties are risk-neutral and share the same interest rate r. The agent
is in addition financially constrained and his reservation utility is normalized to
zero. In every period, the agent is in charge of producing a good. The value of
this good V can be either high (VH) or low (VL), where∆V ≡ VH−VL. The good
value V is observable by all involved entities, but non-verifiable by third parties.2
By implementing effort e ∈ R+, the agent determines the likelihood of whether
the good value will be high or low. More precisely, let
Prob{V = VH |e} = ρ(e) ∈ [0, 1) (1)
2This occurs for instance when the attainment of a specified quality standard is predominant in
the valuation of a good. Quality can be observed and involved parties are able to assess whether a
previously defined quality standard is achieved. Nonetheless, it is sometimes either impossible to
verify the achieved quality, or the associated costs are prohibitively high.
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be the twice-continuously differentiable probability that the high good value will
be realized, where ρ(0) = 0, ρ′(e) > 0, and ρ′′(e) < 0. Effort is non-observable
and imposes strictly convex increasing costs c(e) with c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
Since the realized good value V is non-verifiable, the principal cannot use
this information in an enforceable incentive contract. The principal however, can
provide the agent with a relational incentive contract based upon her subjective
evaluation of the realized good value V . In particular, the principal promises to
pay a bonus β in addition to a fixed transfer α in the event that the high good value
is realized. The agent’s wage wA therefore is
wA =
{
α+ β, if V = VH
α, if V = VL.
(2)
The principal’s promise to pay β needs to be reliable from the agents’ perspective
since its payment cannot be legally enforced. The agent initially trusts the prin-
cipal but plays a grim trigger strategy: If V = VH and the principal violates her
implicit obligation to pay β, the agent will never rely on non-enforceable agree-
ments with the principal again.
As an alternative to subjectively evaluate the agent’s performance, the princi-
pal can employ a supervisor who is in charge of confirming the manifested good
value (supervision). The supervisor is risk-neutral and obtains U¯S ≥ 0 under
his best alternative. By virtue of his supposedly neutral position, the supervisor’s
confirmation potentiates that the realized good value is ‘quasi-verifiable’ from the
courts’ perspective such that it can be applied in an enforceable incentive contract.
In exchange for his service, the principal offers the supervisor the payment wS .
3 Alternative Provisions of Incentives
The subsequent sections elaborate on the principal’s alternatives for providing the
agent with incentives to implement effort. Particulary, the next section considers
the incentive provision by utilizing a spot contracts. The following section inves-
tigates the subjective evaluation of the agent’s performance in a repeated game.
Finally, the case is analyzed where the principal delegates the subjective perfor-
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mance evaluation to a supervisor, which potentially creates incentives to engage
in vertical side-contracting.
3.1 Spot Contract
Suppose the principal offers the agent a contract in a one-shot game. To motivate
effort, the principal can promise the agent to pay the bonus β in case the high
good value VH is realized. Once this occurs however, the principal reneges on
β since its payment cannot be enforced. The agent anticipates this opportunistic
behavior and refuses to implement effort. It is therefore optimal for the principal
to set wA∗ = 0 such that her profit for utilizing a spot contract is ΠSC = VL.
3.2 Subjective Performance Evaluation
If the principal and the agent interact for an infinite number of periods, the princi-
pal’s promise to pay the bonus β can be credible. To derive the self-enforcement
condition for this relational contract, let Π˜SE ≡ max{ΠSC ,ΠS} denote the prin-
cipal’s expected profit she could obtain after reneging on β. Since the agent plays
a grim trigger strategy, the principal’s best alternative can be either to utilize a
spot contract (SC), or to employ the supervisor (S) for evaluating the agent’s
performance.
Suppose for a moment that the high good value is realized. Then, the principal
is not tempted to renege on β if
−β + Π
SE
r
≥ Π˜
SE
r
. (3)
The principal adheres to her promise if paying the bonus β but sustaining the em-
ployment relationship based upon subjective evaluations leads to a higher present
expected profit than her best fall-back Π˜SE .
The principal’s problem is to find the bonus contract (α∗, β∗) which maxi-
mizes the difference between the expected good value and the agent’s expected
wage, while ensuring his participation:
max
α,β,e
ΠSE = VL +∆V ρ(e)− α− βρ(e) (4)
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s.t.
α+ βρ(e)− c(e) ≥ 0 (5)
e ∈ argmax
e˜
α+ βρ(e˜)− c(e˜) (6)
α+ β ≥ 0 (7)
α ≥ 0 (8)
VL +∆V ρ(e)− α− βρ(e)− Π˜SE ≥ rβ. (9)
Condition (5) is the agent’s participation, and (6) his incentive constraint. More-
over, (7) and (8) are the liability limit constraints guaranteing that all payments to
the agent are non-negative. Finally, (9) is the self-enforcement condition ensuring
that the principal’s promise to pay β is credible.
Observe that (6) is equivalent to β(e) = c′(e)/ρ′(e), with β(e) as the required
bonus to induce an arbitrary effort level e. Thus, the expected bonus B(e) =
β(e)ρ(e) to induce e is
B(e) =
c′(e)ρ(e)
ρ′(e)
, (10)
which is assumed to be convex.3 The expected bonus B(e) is characterized by the
likelihood ratio ρ′(e)/ρ(e) which, according to Holmström [1979], measures the
principal’s propensity to expect that the agent has not implemented the anticipated
effort level e when V = VH .
Proposition 1 For a subjective performance evaluation, the optimal fixed transfer
is α∗ = 0. Moreover, the optimal bonus β∗ is characterized as follows:
(i): If r ≤ rSE , the optimal bonus is β∗ = c′(e∗)/ρ′(e∗), where e∗ solves
∆V ρ′(e) = B′(e). Thus, the principal obtains
ΠSE(e∗) = VL +∆V ρ(e∗)−B(e∗). (11)
(ii): If rSE < r ≤ r̂ SE , the optimal bonus β∗(r) is the highest value of β
which implicitly solves
β =
1
r + ρ(e(β))
[
VL +∆V ρ(e(β))− Π˜SE
]
. (12)
Consequently,
ΠSE(β∗(r)) = VL + [∆V − β∗(r)] ρ(e(β∗(r))). (13)
3It can be shown that assuming c′′′(e) ≥ 0 suffices to ensure convexity of B(e) for all e.
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(iii): If r > r̂ SE , the optimal bonus is β∗(r) = 0 such that ΠSE(r) = VL.
Proof See appendix.
The optimal bonus contract and the principal’s expected profit for different in-
terest rates r are illustrated in figure 1. The straight line rβ thereby represents the
right side of the self-enforcement condition (9). Accordingly, the principal can
find a credible bonus β > 0 whenever rβ either tangents or intersects the adjusted
profit curveΠSE(β)−Π˜SE . The principal can credibly commit to pay the efficient
bonus β∗ if r ≤ rSE .4 In this case, the value of a sustained employment rela-
tionship based on a subjective performance evaluation eliminates the principal’s
temptation to renege on β∗. The agent anticipates that the principal would deliver
on her promise to pay β∗, and is therefore motivated to implement the efficient
(second-best) effort level e∗(β∗). For rSE < r ≤ r̂ SE however, the principal is
compelled to adjust β in order to ensure it satisfies the self-enforcement condition
(9). This follows from the fact that a higher interest rate r imposes a less severe
‘penalty’ on the principal for violating the relational contract with the agent. In-
deed, the more β∗(r) deviates from the efficient bonus β∗ = c′(e∗)/ρ′(e∗), the
lower is the principal’s expected profit ΠSE(r). Finally, if r > r̂ SE , the principal
cannot find a strictly positive bonus which satisfies (9) such that β∗(r) = 0. Due
the lack of credible incentives, the agent implements e∗(0) = 0 which implies
ΠSE(r) = VL. Thus, the principal obtains the same profit as for utilizing a spot
contract.
3.3 Supervision
As shown in the preceding section, the agent cannot be motivated to implement the
efficient (second-best) effort level if the principal cannot credibly commit herself
the pay the efficient bonus. Alternatively, the principal can employ a supervisor
who is charged with affirming the realized good value such that it can be applied
in an enforceable incentive contract. However, empowering the supervisor to sub-
jectively evaluate the agent’s performance could create incentives for the involved
parties to engage in vertical side-contracting. To exemplify the effect of potential
4For parsimony, the characterizations of the cut off interest rates for this and the subsequent
propositions are relegated to the respective proof in the appendix.
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6ΠSE(β)− Π˜SE
β∗(r)β∗(r̂ SE) β∗(e∗) β
-
ΠSE(β)− Π˜SE
rβ
rβ∗(e∗), r < rSE
r̂ SEβ∗(r̂ SE)
rβ∗(r), rSE < r < r̂ SErβ, r > r̂ SE
Figure 1: Optimal Bonus Contract for a Subjective Performance Evaluation
collusion on the provision of incentives, I consider the contractual arrangements
under supervision with and without potential side-contracting separately.
3.3.1 Supervision without Collusion
Under the exclusion of side-contracting by assumption, the supervisor reveals his
observation about the realized good value V always truthfully. Consequently, the
principal is forced to pay β in the event that V = VH .
The principal’s objective is to maximize the difference between the expected
good value and the expected compensations for the agent and for the supervisor.
Their optimal contracts under collusion-free supervision thus solve
max
α,β,e,wS
ΠS|NC = VL +∆V ρ(e)− α− βρ(e)− wS (14)
s.t.
wS ≥ U¯S (15)
(5), (6), (7), (8),
where (15) is the supervisor’s participation constraint. This maximization prob-
lem is essentially identical to the one considered in section 3.2 for the subjective
performance evaluation by the principal. The only difference here is that the self-
enforcement condition (9) is not relevant, and wS ≥ U¯S appears as an additional
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side condition. Thus, we obtain the same optimal bonus contract for the agent
as under the principal’s evaluation of his performance for r ≤ rSE . Moreover,
to minimize costs, the principal sets wS∗ = U¯S . The principal’s expected profit
therefore is
ΠS|NC(e∗) = VL +∆V ρ(e∗)−B(e∗)− U¯S, (16)
where e∗ solves ∆V ρ′(e) = B′(e). Apparently, employing the supervisor can be
only beneficial if his contribution exceeds his compensation, or formally, if
wS∗ = U¯S ≤ ∆V ρ(e∗)−B(e∗). (17)
To expose the effect of potential side-contracting with the supervisor on the in-
centive provision, I shall assume that U¯S is sufficiently small such that (17) holds.
3.3.2 Supervision with Potential Collusion
This section investigates the case where collusion among the supervisor and ei-
ther the agent or the principal is potentially a dominant strategy. All involved
parties can perfectly infer whether collusion occurred once the confirmed good
value deviates from the one observed. If the agent and the supervisor engaged
in side-contracting, the principal can replace them by hiring new employees from
the labor market. By contrast, after the principal colluded with the supervisor, the
agent does not rely on incentive payments contingent on subjective performance
evaluations neither by the supervisor nor by the principal. Consequently, the prin-
cipal’s fall-back is the application of a spot contract as considered in section 3.1.
From the perspective of the external observers such as the courts, the agent and
the principal are the immediate parties involved in the dispute over the value of
the good, whereas the supervisor is the supposedly neutral entity in this conflict.
Therefore, the statement from the supervisor will have a greater weightage in
swaying the court’s decision. Collusion will thus work in favor of the colluding
parties because proving the good’s value is prohibitively expensive.
The principal’s objective is to find contracts for the agent and supervisor en-
suring that no party can be better off by side-contracting. Let T i denote the bribe
the agent (i = A) or the principal (i = P ) offers the supervisor in exchange for
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affirming the desired good value. If the supervisor accepts T i, he does not deviate
from the stipulated behavior and confirms the requested value. However, if
T i ≤ w
S − U¯S
r
, (18)
he refuses to engage in side-contracting since the transfer T i does not compensate
for his prospective loss in utility.
Suppose the low good value is realized such that the agent could be better off
by bribing the supervisor with the aim of obtaining his bonus β. The maximum
bribe T¯A the agent is willing to pay equals his one-time gain β and his discounted
loss of expected utility after collusion took place:
T¯A = β − 1
r
[α+ βρ(e)− c(e)] . (19)
In contrast, if the high good value is eventually realized, the principal could try
to avoid the payment of β by bribing the supervisor into confirming a low value.
The maximum bribe T¯ P the principal is willing to pay equals her one-time gain β
and her discounted loss of expected profit after she engaged in side-contracting:
T¯ P = β − Π
S|C − ΠSC
r
. (20)
Whenever T¯ P >
[
wS − U¯S] /r, the agent anticipates collusion among the princi-
pal and the supervisor and is therefore better off by implementing e∗(0) = 0.
Proposition 2 The collusion-proof contracts are characterized as follows:
(i): If r ≤ rS ≡ min{rA, rP}, the efficient contracts with α∗ = 0, wS∗ = U¯S ,
and β∗ = c′(e∗)/ρ′(e∗) are collusion-proof, where
rA ≡ ρ(e∗)− ρ
′(e∗)c(e∗)
c′(e∗)
, rP ≡ ρ
′(e∗)
c′(e∗)
[
∆V ρ(e∗)− U¯S]− ρ(e∗).
(ii): If rS < r ≤ r̂ S , the collusion-proof contracts are characterized by
α∗ + wS∗ = U¯S + β∗(r) [r − ρ(·)] + c(·), if rA < r ≤ rP ,
where α∗ ≥ 0, wS∗ ≥ U¯S and rP , rA < r
α∗ = 0, wS∗ = U¯S if rP < r ≤ rA,
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and β∗(r) as the highest value of β which implicitly solves
βA(r) ≡ β∗(r) : r = [∆V ρ′(e(β))− c′(e(β))] ∂e
∂β
, if rA < r ≤ rP
βP (r) ≡ β∗(r) : β = ∆V ρ(e(β))− U¯
S
r + ρ(e(β))
, if rP < r ≤ rA
β∗(r) = min{βA(r), βP (r)}, if rP , rA < r.
(iii): If r > r̂ S , the principal sets α∗ = β∗(r) = wS∗ = 0 .
Proof See appendix.
If r ≤ rS , all parties sufficiently value a sustained employment relationship
under supervision such that no one is tempted to collude. The principal therefore
provides the agent with the same bonus contract as for the collusion-free case and
hence, obtains the same expected profit. In contrast, if rS < r ≤ r̂ S , the principal
is forced to adjust the agent’s—and possibly the supervisor’s—contract in order
to prevent side-contracting. Given the specific contract adjustments, she obtains
ΠS|C(r) = VL + [∆V − β∗(r)] ρ(e(β∗(r)))− α∗ − wS∗. (21)
For a brief discussion of the potential cases exposed by proposition 2, keep in mind
that rP refers to the principal’s temptation to collude for the efficient contracts
(α∗, β∗) and wS∗, and rA to the agent’s temptation, respectively. If rA < r ≤ rP ,
the agent but not the principal is tempted to collude. Then, the principal needs to
enhance either the supervisor’s payment wS∗, or the agent’s fixed compensation
α∗ above their efficient levels to deter both from side-contracting. Contempora-
neously, the principal is compelled to offer the agent a bonus β∗(r) below the
efficient level β∗ such that he is provided with too low powered incentives. The
latter adjustment is also required in the event that rP < r ≤ rA. For r > r̂ S
however, the principal cannot find a strictly positive bonus which eliminates her
temptation to collude.5 The principal is therefore forced to set β∗(r) = 0 which
further implies e∗(0) = 0. Moreover, there is no value in employing the supervisor
such that it is optimal to set wS∗ = 0. Accordingly, ΠS|C(r) = VL for r > r̂ S .
5The principal can nevertheless find a strictly positive bonus for all r which deters the agent
from side-contracting, see proof of proposition 2.
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4 Incentive Provision and Collusion
This section elaborates on the optimal provision of incentives, and illustrates how
it is affected by potential collusion. For the sake of lucidity, I identify first the op-
timal incentive schemes for the collusion-free case, where the supervisor confirms
the realized good value V always truthfully.
Proposition 3 For the collusion-free case, there exists a threshold interest rate r̂
with rSE ≤ r̂, such that the principal obtains
ΠNC =
{
ΠSE, if r ≤ r̂
ΠS|NC , if r > r̂.
Proof See appendix.
The principal prefers to subjectively evaluate the agent’s performance as long
as she can credibly commit to pay a sufficiently high bonus β∗(r), i.e. r ≤ r̂. In
contrast, if r > r̂, the credible bonus β∗(r) yields a lower expected profit than the
employment of the supervisor as a mean to provide the agent with an enforceable
incentive contract.
Subsequently, I abrogate the temporarily preclusion of side-contracting. Thus,
the contracts under supervision need to be collusion-proof in order to be effective.
Proposition 4 For the case with potential collusion, the principal obtains
ΠC =
{
ΠSE, if r ≤ r̂ SE
ΠSC , if r > r̂ SE ,
(22)
where r̂ SE ≥ r̂.
Proof See appendix.
There are two fundamental implications regarding the effect of potential col-
lusion on the incentive provision. Firstly, a subjective evaluation of the agent’s
performance apparently remains optimal for r ≤ r̂. In addition, the principal now
favors a subjective evaluation over supervision for r̂ ≤ r ≤ r̂ SE . If r > r̂ SE
however, utilizing a spot contract is now the principal’s superior alternative in-
stead of supervision. The rationale for the latter two observations is as follows.
12
Collusion-proofness under supervision requires either a sufficiently low interest
rate r, or the provision of an inefficient but credible bonus. For the same inter-
est rates however, the principal can commit herself to pay a more efficient bonus
β∗(r), or for r ≤ rSE , the optimal bonus β∗(e∗). As a result, a subjective perfor-
mance evaluation is more profitable than supervision for all r ≤ r̂ SE .
Secondly, potential collusion leads to a higher cut off interest rate r̂ SE for
a subjective performance evaluation to be superior. This reflects the principal’s
more severe penalty for violating the relational contract with the agent as a result
of a less lucrative fall-back. This further implies that the principal can now cred-
ibly commit to pay a more efficient bonus for rSE < r ≤ r̂ SE , yielding a higher
expected profit under the subjective performance evaluation.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the optimal provision of incentives in an agency relation-
ship, when verifiable measures about the agent’s performance are not available. It
elaborated on two alternatives for the principal to provide the agent nonetheless
with incentives: (i) to subjectively evaluate his performance; and (ii), to delegate
the performance evaluation to a supervisor. Supervision however, might constitute
incentives for the involved parties to engage in vertical side-contracting.
The analysis in this paper points to the ambiguous effect of anticipated col-
lusive behavior on the provision of incentives. First, if superior relational con-
tracts based upon the principal’s subjective evaluation are not feasible, potential
collusion compels the principal to utilize inferior spot contracts, whereas super-
vision would have been more profitable otherwise. Spot contracts are thereby the
principal’s best alternative to bypass the costs associated with the prevention of
side-contracting. Second, anticipated collusion can be advantageous for organi-
zations since it could facilitate the achievement, or improve the profitability of
superior relational contracts based on subjective performance evaluations. This
can be observed because a worse fall-back position for the principal augments the
credibility of non-enforceable incentive payments depending upon her subjective
evaluation.
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This paper further considered the efficient adjustment of contracts with the
aim of preventing side-contracting under supervision. Suppose that being able to
observe the agent’s performance imposes significant costs on the principal, poten-
tially due to a long hierarchical or geographical distance to the agent. Employing
a supervisor as a mean to receive contractible measures about the agent’s perfor-
mance might therefore be the principal’s superior alternative. This paper exposed
that deterring the involved parties from side-contracting potentially requires the
adjustment of contracts in two ways. First, the agent is provided with too low
powered incentives inducing him to implement an inefficient effort level. Second,
the supervisor obtains a compensation exceeding the efficient level that aims at
ensuring his participation.
The latter implication provides a supplementary rationale for high executive
compensations. Accordingly, high compensations for executives are necessary to
maintain their neutral position for assessing their subordinates’ performance. This
is shown to be essential for assuring the credibility of such incentive device.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Note first that e > 0 requires β > 0. Thus, (7) is satisfied if (8) holds, and can
therefore be omitted. Assume for a moment that (9) is satisfied for the optimal
bonus contract. Let λ and κ be Lagrange multipliers. Then, the Lagrangian is
L(α, e) = VL +∆V ρ(e)− α−B(e) + λ [α+B(e)− c(e)] + ξα. (23)
The first-order conditions with respect to α and e are
−1 + λ+ ξ = 0, (24)
∆V ρ′(e)−B′(e) + λ [B′(e)− c′(e)] = 0. (25)
Suppose λ > 0. Then, α+B(e)−c(e) = 0 due to complementary slackness. Since
α ≥ 0 this would imply thatB(e) ≤ c(e) and hence, e = 0. Thus, λ > 0 cannot be
a solution which implies that λ = 0. We can then infer from (24) that ξ = 1, which
implies α∗ = 0 due to complementary slackness. Since λ = 0 it follows from (25)
that e∗ solves∆V ρ′(e) = B′(e). Concavity of ρ(e) and convexity ofB(e) ensures
that the first-order approach is sufficient. Substituting α∗ = 0 and B(e∗) in the
principal’s objective function givesΠSE(e∗) = IL+∆V ρ(e∗)−B(e∗). Moreover,
substituting ΠSE(e∗) and β∗(e∗) = c′(e∗)/ρ′(e∗) in (9) leads to
r ≤ ρ
′(e∗)
c′(e∗)
[
VL +∆V ρ(e
∗)− Π˜SE
]
− ρ(e∗) ≡ rSE. (26)
If r > rSE , β∗(e∗)would violate (9). In this case, the principal chooses the highest
feasible β such that (9) binds:
VL +∆V ρ(e(β))− βρ(e(β))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠSE(β)
−Π˜SE = rβ. (27)
The left side is concave increasing in β for β < β∗(e∗), whereas the right side
is linear increasing with slope r. Thus, depending on r, there are potentially
two values of β solving (27). Let β∗(r) denote the maximum value of β which
implicitly solves (27), or equivalently,
β =
1
r + ρ(e(β))
[
VL +∆V ρ(e(β))− Π˜SE
]
. (28)
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Furthermore, implicit differentiating (27) gives
∂β
∂r
=
β
∂ΠSE(β)
∂β
− r
. (29)
Recall thatΠSE(β) is concave increasing in β as long as β < β∗(e∗), and the right
side of (27) is linear increasing in β with slope r. Thus, ∂ΠSE(β)/∂β
∣∣
β=β∗(r) < r
for rSE < r ≤ r̂ SE , where r̂ SE is characterized below. Hence, ∂β/∂r < 0.
Finally, there exists a cut off r̂ SE such that the principal cannot find a β > 0 for
r > r̂ SE which satisfies (27). Thus, β∗(r) = 0 for r > r̂ SE such that e∗(0) = 0,
and consequently, ΠSE(r) = VL. Since the left side of (27) is concave increasing
in β as long as β < β∗(e∗), and the right side is linear increasing, r̂ SE implies that
rβ tangents ΠSE(β)− Π˜SE . Thus, r̂ SE is implicitly characterized by the tangent
condition r = ∂ΠSE(β)/∂β
∣∣
β=β∗(r), or equivalently,
r = [∆V − β∗(r)] ρ′(e(β∗(r))) ∂e
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=β∗(r)
− ρ(e(β∗(r))). (30)
2
Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider first the optimal contracts wS∗ = U¯S and (α∗, β∗). According to (18),
the supervisor would collude if T i > 0, i = A,P . Hence, collusion-proofness
requires T¯ i = 0. Substituting α∗ = 0 and β∗(e∗) = c′(e∗)/ρ′(e∗) in (19) yields
the condition ensuring the agent refrains from side-contracting:
r ≤ ρ(e∗)− ρ
′(e∗)c(e∗)
c′(e∗)
≡ rA. (31)
Likewise, substituting ΠS|C(e∗), β∗(e∗), and ΠSC = VL in (20) leads to the con-
dition guaranteeing that the principal has no incentive to collude:
r ≤ ρ
′(e∗)
c′(e∗)
[
∆V ρ(e∗)− U¯S]− ρ(e∗) ≡ rP . (32)
Thus, the optimal contracts are collusion-proof if r ≤ rS ≡ min{rA, rP}.
For r > rS , there are three cases to discuss: rA < r ≤ rP , rP < r ≤ rA, and
rP , rA < r. Consider first the case rA < r ≤ rP . Combining (18) and (19) gives
wS − U¯S
r
≥ β − α+ βρ(·)− c(·)
r
,
⇔ α+ wS ≥ U¯S + β [r − ρ(·)] + c(·). (33)
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To minimize costs, the principal sets α and wS such that (33) binds, provided
that α∗ ≥ 0 and wS∗ ≥ U¯S . Substituting (α + wS) in the principal’s objective
functions leads to the simplified problem for rA < r ≤ rP :
max
β
ΠS|C = VL +∆V ρ(e(β))− rβ − c(e(β))− U¯S. (34)
The first-order condition indicates that β∗(r) implicitly solves
r = [∆V ρ′(e(β))− c′(e(β))] ∂e
∂β
. (35)
Moreover, implicit differentiation gives
∂β
∂r
=
1
∂
∂β
[
[∆V ρ′(e(β))− c′(e(β))] ∂e
∂β
] , (36)
where the denominator is strictly negative due to the second-order condition.
Thus, ∂β/∂r < 0. Next, consider the case rP < r ≤ rA. Observe from (20)
that enhancing α would reduce ΠS|C and thus, raise T¯ P . Hence, α∗ = 0. More-
over, the marginal effect of raisingwS on the collusion-proofness condition (18) is
1/r, and on (20) is −1/r, i.e. changing wS does not support collusion-proofness.
Thus, to minimize costs, wS∗ = U¯S . Moreover, the principal chooses the highest
feasible β such that T¯ P = 0, which is equivalent to
VL +∆V ρ(e(β))− βρ(e(β))− U¯S︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠS|C(β)
−ΠSC = rβ. (37)
The left side is concave increasing in β as long as β < β∗(e∗), whereas the right
side is linear increasing in β. Consequently, depending on r, there are potentially
two values of β solving (37). Let β∗(r) denote the maximum value of β which
implicitly solves (37), or equivalently,
β =
1
r + ρ(e(β))
[
∆V ρ(e(β))− U¯S] . (38)
Implicit differentiating (37) gives
∂β
∂r
=
β
∂ΠS|C(β)
∂β
− r
. (39)
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Recall that ΠS|C(β) is concave increasing in β for β < β∗(e∗), whereas the right
side of (37) is linear increasing with slope r. Hence, ∂ΠS|C(β)/∂β
∣∣
β=β∗(r) < r
for r > rP . As a result, ∂β/∂r < 0. In the final case, rP , rA < r, the principal
needs to set α and wS as for rA < r ≤ rP in order to prevent collusion. Moreover,
to ensure that neither the principal nor the agent colludes, it is necessary to choose
the lowest β which contemporaneously satisfies (35) and (38).
Finally notice that the principal can always find a β > 0 which satisfies (35) for
r > rA. In contrast, if r > rP , there exists a cut off r̂ S such that the principal
cannot find a β > 0 for r > r̂ S which satisfies (37). Thus, β∗(r) = 0 for all
r > r̂ S . The cut off r̂ S thereby implies that rβ tangents ΠS|C(β) − ΠSC , see
(37). As a consequence, r̂ S is implicitly characterized by the tangent condition
r = ∂ΠS|C(β)/∂β
∣∣
β=β∗(r), or equivalently,
r = [∆V − β∗(r)] ρ′(e(β∗(r))) ∂e
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=β∗(r)
− ρ(e(β∗(r))), (40)
2
Proof of Proposition 3.
Note first that ΠS|NC ≥ ΠSC = VL for all values of r. Moreover, ΠSE ≥ ΠS|NC
is satisfied for r ≤ rSE . As shown in proof of proposition 1, ∂β/∂r < 0 under a
subjective evaluation. Hence, ΠSE(r) is decreasing in r for rSE < r ≤ r̂ SE such
that there exists a cut off r̂ satisfying ΠSE(β∗(r)) = ΠS|NC , or equivalently,
∆V [ρ(e(β∗(r)))− ρ(e∗(β∗))] = B(e(β∗(r)))−B(e∗(β∗))− U¯S (41)
Finally, rSE ≤ r̂ since ΠSE = ΠS|NC for r ≤ rSE and U¯S = 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.
Observe first that ΠSE ≥ ΠS|C for r ≤ rSE . For the subsequent proof, it is nec-
essary to show that rSE ≥ rS = min{rA, rP}. Apparently, it suffices to demon-
strate that rSE ≥ rP . Since the agent plays grim trigger strategy, utilizing a spot
contract is the principal’s best fall-back after she either reneged on β (subjective
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performance evaluation) or colluded with the supervisor (supervision). Hence,
Π˜SE = Π˜S|C = ΠSC . As a result, rSE ≥ rP is equivalent to
ΠSE − ΠSC
β∗(e∗)
≥ Π
S|C − ΠSC
β∗(e∗)
, (42)
which is satisfied since ΠSE ≥ ΠS|C . Thus, rSE ≥ rS = min{rA, rP}.
Next, it is necessary to verify that ΠSE(r) ≥ ΠS|C(r) for rSE < r ≤ r̂ SE . There
are two cases to consider: (i) rSE ≥ r̂ S; and (ii), rSE < r̂ S . For case (i), it
follows directly that ΠSE(r) ≥ ΠS|C(r) for rSE < r ≤ r̂ SE since ΠS|C(r) = VL
for r > r̂ S . Now consider case (ii). As exposed by proposition 2, there are
three potential cases for adjusting the contracts under supervision appropriately:
(a) rA < r ≤ rP , (b) rP < r ≤ rA; and (c), rP , rA < r. Consider first
case (a). As shown, rSE ≥ rP such that ΠSE ≥ ΠS|C(r) for rA < r ≤ rP .
Next, consider case (b). As (29) in connection with (27), and (39) in connection
with (37) indicate, β∗(r) is decreasing in r with the same rate under a subjective
performance evaluation as under supervision. Thus, ΠSE(r) is decreasing in r
for rSE < r ≤ r̂ SE with the same rate as ΠS|C(r) for rP < r ≤ rA. Since
rSE ≥ rP it follows that ΠSE(r) ≥ ΠS|C(r) for rP < r ≤ rA. If (c) applies, the
principal chooses the lowest β which contemporaneously satisfies (35) and (38),
see proof of proposition 2. Thus, β∗(r) under a subjective performance evaluation
is greater than the adjusted β∗(r) under supervision. Hence, ΠSE(r) ≥ ΠS|C(r)
for rP , rA < r. In sum, ΠSE(r) ≥ ΠS|C(r) for rSE < r ≤ r̂ SE . For r > r̂ SE
however, the principal utilizes a spot contract because a strictly positive bonus β
is not credible under a subjective performance evaluation; and induces collusion
under supervision.
Finally, Π˜SE = ΠS|NC (collusion-free case) changes to Π˜SE = ΠSC (collusion
case), where ΠS|NC ≥ ΠSC . Hence, due to a worse fall-back position for the
principal, r̂ SE ≥ r̂. 2
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